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HUMAN RIGHTS AND NON-INTERVENTION
IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM*
Jose A. Cabranes**

T

promotion and protection of human rights is a recent and
significant innovation in the inter-American system. For more
than a decade after its founding, the Organization of American
States (OAS) exhibited no particular inclination to undertake a program to provide international protection for fundamental freedoms
within member states. The proclamation in 1948 of the highlyvaunted American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man1
and the frequent invocation of "human rights," "universal morality," and "the rights of man" in resolutions and international instruments produced by the regional organization of the American republics amounted to little more than well-intentioned, but quite
fanciful, rhetoric.
The long silence of the inter-American system is remarkable
when contrasted with the continuing efforts of the United Nations
to elaborate an International Bill of Rights and the significant accomplishments of the Council of Europe in implementing on a regional basis the principal values enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The OAS' lack of interest, until quite
recently, in undertaking a similar international program to protect
human rights in the American republics is a function of several
very special factors, the most important of which is the traditional
Latin American repudiation of intervention, in whatever form and
for whatever reason, in the internal affairs of American states. This
article will examine the recent efforts to protect such rights in the
American continent within the context of the evolution of the interAmerican system and the development within that system of the
law of non-intervention.
HE

I.

NoN-INTERVENTION AND "AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL

LAw"

The concept of what Judge Alejandro Alvarez styled "American
international law" was not of Latin American origin. Nor was it
• An abstract of this article was presented at a Colloquium on Regional International Organizations sponsored by the British Institute of International and Comparative Law at Ditchley Park, Oxfordshire, England, July 1-3, 1966.-Ed.
• • Kellett Research Fellow, Columbia University; lately Humanitarian Trust Student in Public International Law, University of Cambridge. A.B. 1961, Columbia
University; LL.B. 1965, Yale University.-Ed.
I. Resolution XXX, Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogota,
Colombia, March 30-May 2, 1948, Final Act (Pan-American Union 1948), p. 38. For
a convenient text, see 43 AM, J. !NT'L L, 133 (Supp. 1949).
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intended by its Latin American proponents to be applied exclusively
by the Latin American states in their relations with one another.
Although much of the impetus for the development of a regional
international law came from Latin American statesmen and jurists,
and a considerable part of its appeal is attributable to the common
Hispanic cultural heritage of the nations of Latin America, the idea
of a regional system of public order has its source in President Monroe's historic pronouncement of 1823.2 The American international
law expounded by Alvarez, Drago, and the disciples of Calvo developed as a response to the interventionist claims of European creditor
states in the latter part of the nineteenth and the beginning of the
twentieth centuries, and subsequently as a reaction to the United
States' own version of "American public law." The principal object
of the regional international law propounded by Latin American
jurists was the negation of the European claims and the replacement
of the unilateral North American concept of a regional system of
public order with one that reflected the interests of all of the American republics.
Because of its predominant economic and military position, the
United States had come to regard the New World as its historic
sphere of influence and had based its conceptions of national security upon the detachment of the hemisphere from the political affairs
of the rest of the world. The Monroe Doctrine, stated as a putative
principle of public international law, evolved to express the policy
goals of the nation that had fathered it. Until the last decades of
the nineteenth century and the resurgence of Manifest Destiny, resort by the United States to the Monroe Doctrine had, with varying
degrees of success, been limited to protesting or forestalling new acquisitions of territory in the American hemisphere by extra-continental powers. In 1895, however, the United States invoked the
Doctrine in its efforts to have the Anglo-Venezuelan boundary dispute settled amicably. The note of the Department of State to the
British Government, which affirmed that the United States would
2. For the text of the pertinent extracts of President Monroe's annual message to
Congress, see 6 MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 401 (1906). The most compre•
hensive studies of the origins and development of the Monroe Doctrine are the series
of volumes by Professor Dexter Perkins: HANDS OFF: A HISTORY OF THE MONROE
DOCTRINE (1941); THE MONROE DOCTRINE, 1867-1907 (1937); THE MONROE DOCTRINE,
1826-1867 (1933); THE MoNROE DOCTRINE, 1823-1826 (1932). A good documentary
history of the Doctrine, including a useful collection of the views of North American
and Latin American jurists and statesmen is provided in Judge (then Professor)
Alvarez's work in commemoration of the centennary of President Monroe's pronounce•
ment. ALVAREZ, THE MONROE DOCTRINE: ITS IMPORTANCE IN THE INTERNATIONAL LIFE
OF THE STATES OF THE NEW WORLD (1924).
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regard as a violation of the Monroe Doctrine any pressure brought
on Venezuela to yield to British territorial demands, could hardly
have been fully satisfactory to Latin American statesmen, some of
whom had hoped that the Doctrine merely meant that the United
States would insulate the Western Hemisphere from territorial
claims by European powers. For, in asserting "a doctrine of American public law ... long and firmly established and supported, ... "
Secretary of State Richard Olney offered a new and portentous
rationale:
To-day the United States is practically sovereign on this continent,
and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition. Why? It is not because of the pure friendship or goodwill felt
for it. It is not simply by reason of its high character as a civilized
state, nor because wisdom and justice and equity are the invariable
characteristics of the dealings of the United States. It is because, in
addition to all other grounds, its infinite resources combined with its
isolated position render it master of the situation and practically invulnerable as against any or all other powers.3

During the administration of Theodore Roosevelt, the United
States used the Monroe Doctrine to claim competence to exercise
"an international police power" in the New World. Rather than
risk European armed intervention to enforce the debt obligations
3. 6 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 553. In a July 14, 1870, communication
from Secretary of State Hamilton Fish to President Grant the Doctrine was described
as "a principle of government for this continent and its adjacent islands . . . ." Id.
at 430. In response to Secretary Olney's pronouncements on the Monroe Doctrine,
which he described as "Mr. Olney's doctrines," the British Foreign Secretary, Lord
Salisbury, rejected the claim that the Doctrine or its recent invocations were a part of,
or sanctioned by, international law:
[I]nternational law is founded on the general consent of nations; and no statesman,
however eminent, and no nation, however powerful, are competent to insert into
the code of international law a novel principle which was never recognized
before, and which has not since been accepted by the Government of any other
country. The United States have a right, like any other nation, to interpose in
any controversy by which their own interests are affected; and they are the judge
whether those interests are touched, and in what measure they should be sus•
tained. But their rights are in no way strengthened or extended by the fact that
the controversy affects some territory which is called American .••• Mr. Olney's
principle that "American questions are for American decision," . . . can not be
sustained by any reasoning drawn from the law of nations.
Lord Salisbury to Sir Julian Pauncefote, the .British Minister to the United States,
Nov. 26, 1895, in id. at 563. Less than a month after the transmission of Lord
Salisbury's response, a forceful rejoinder on the question of the Doctrine's place in
international law was provided by President Cleveland in a special message to Congress
on the Venezuelan affair, December 17, 1895:
Practically the principle for which we contend has peculiar if not exclusive
relation to the United States. It may not have been admitted in so many words
to the code of international law, but since in international councils every nation
is entitled to the rights belonging to it, if the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine is something we may justly claim it has its place in the code of international
law as certainly and as securely as if it were specifically mentioned .•.•
Id. at 577.
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of Latin American states, the United States asserted, in the so-called
Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, the right to intervene
in the affairs of Latin American states in order to prevent intervention by extra-continental powers. 4 Naturally enough, Monroismo
came to be regarded in Latin America as synonymous with the Roosevelt policy of "the big stick" and with the unilateral claim to the
right to intervene in the internal affairs of states that failed to conform to the United States' conception of "reasonable efficiency and
decency in social and political matters."
The Roosevelt Corollary-and, for that matter, the Olney Pronouncement of 1895 and much of the Latin American policy of the
United States until the administration of Franklin Roosevelt-was
significant not simply for its implicit denial of the principle of equality of states that underlies the very concept of international law. Of
equal importance was the unabashed proclamation, which invariably
accompanied the applications of this new version of the Monroe
Doctrine, of the superiority of United States political and social institutions and the express denial of confidence in both the standards
and the machinery of justice of the Latin American states. Indeed,
this lack of respect for the political independence and sovereignty
of the Latin American states in "flagrant cases of wrongdoing or impotence" was a faithful expression of the dominant North American conception of American regional law.
It is no coincidence that, while the law asserted by the United
States to govern the international relations of states in the Western
Hemisphere reflected confidence in her ovm institutions and standards of justice and suspicion of those of its southern neighbors, the
law propounded by Latin American publicists revealed an overwhelming concern for the unlimited independence and territorial
integrity of the American states as well as respect for local standards
of justice. The "American international law" promoted by Latin
American writers and statesmen may indeed have found an appealing rationale in "the spirit of American fraternity," as Alvarez sug4. Roosevelt's doctrine of "protective intervention" was asserted in his annual
message to Congress in 1904:
Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count upon our hearty
friendship. If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency
and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrongdoing,
or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society,
may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized
nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to
the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant
cases of wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.
6 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 596-97; also quoted in THE EVOLUTION OF OUR LATIN
AMERICAN PoucY: A DOCUMENTARY REcoRD 361-62 (Gantenbein ed. 1950).
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gested,5 but the traditional rhetoric of Pan Americanism was not
its principal source. The interest of Latin Americans in an American international law was aroused not by "continental solidarity" 6
or l' esprit international americain,7 but rather by a common fear of
North American expansionism and a common concern for Latin
American political independence. The work of jurists such as Alvarez in elucidating the concept of regional international law, the
affirmation and ultimate acceptance of the Drago Doctrine, the persistent assertion of the doctrine that bears the name of Carlos Calvo,
and the slow start and unique form of the human rights program of
the OAS can be understood only against the background of the
United States' historic claim to a special competence in shaping the
public order of the Americas and the response to this claim by the
Latin American states.
From the time that the Latin American states obtained their
independence from Spain and Portugal, they have been acutely
concerned with the fundamental problem of national existence: how
to maintain the respect of other, more powerful states for their
political independence and territorial integrity. The Latin American
states are, as Professor S. E. Finer has recently observed, "the oldest
of the 'new states.' " 8 Not unlike the emergent states of Africa and
Asia in the 1950's and 1960's, the Latin American republics were
poor, weak, and fearful of the intentions of larger powers. Turning
to international law for the protection of their vital interests, they
nonetheless rejected or sought to modify those principles of law
which they had played no role in forming and which now seemed
to serve only the interests of the large powers.
In their own self-interest, Latin American jurists readily accepted
the "two worlds" idea that lay at the heart of the Monroe Doctrine
and the Roosevelt Corollary; they also agreed that the separation of
the Old World and the New World required the elaboration of an
international law responsive to this separate development. In addition, they were receptive to the principle of non-intervention by
extra-continental powers in the internal affairs of states in the Western Hemisphere. But they could not have been expected to accept,
and they did not accept, the United States' claim that it could exercise
an international police power, even where that power was ostensibly
5. Alvarez, Latin America and International Law, 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 269, 294 (1909).
6. Id. at 336-37.
7. Asylum Case, (1950] I.C.J. Rep. 266, 294 (Alvarez, J., dissenting).
8. Finer, The Argentine Trouble: Between Sword and State, in Encounter, Sept.
1965, pp. 59, 66.
·
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designed merely to forestall intervention by European states.9 What
Latin American proponents of an American international law
sought, therefore, was a body of law that expressed their common
abhorrence both of intervention in their internal affairs and of threats
to their political independence.
While realizing the very practical benefits that they might derive
from an American international law, Latin American statesmen and
jurists rejected the contention that the United States was, or could
be, the sole source of that law. A true public order of the Americas,
they argued, must rest on the recognition of the juridical equality of
states: each American state must have an equal voice in formulating
that order. Although not unaware of the resulting numerical advantage that the Latin American states would thereby enjoy in matters
of common interest, Latin American publicists fully realized that no
legal regime for the relations of the American states could possibly
serve their purposes without the ratification and cooperation of the
wealthiest and most powerful of their number. So it was that in the
very years in which the United States was asserting a strongly interventionist doctrine as the settled law of the New World, the convergence of Latin American legal philosophy and diplomatic practice
took place. As Professor Samuel Flagg Bemis has observed: "Latin
American jurisprudence strained toward the Doctrine of NonIntervention under whatever circumstances, toward the absolute
and unhampered sovereignty of the state, even toward its complete
irresponsibility to foreign governments." 10 He continued:
It was the supreme diplomatic objective of the twenty Latiri American republics to write this into a code of "American international
law," and to get the United States to ratify it. That would bind the
United States against further interventions, even of a protective
9. Professor Bemis, who believes that "[the] Manifest Destiny of imperialism •••
was not the true spirit of American nationality, nor altogether a permanent feature
in the history of the Republic," prefers to call this claim to an international police
power "protective imperialism.'' "The New Manifest Destiny, the Cuban question and
the war with Spain had ushered in • . • an era of protective imperalism focused on
the defense of an Isthmian canal in a passageway between the two seacoasts of the
Continental Republic vital to its naval communications and to its security." BEMIS,
THE LATIN AMERICAN Pouey OF nm UNITED STATES 140 (1943). It may be observed
that few other North American authorities on the United States' Latin American
policy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century have been as unabashedly
sympathetic in their assessment of the United States' policy goals and the means
chosen to implement them. There is perhaps something revealing about the fact,
noted by Professor Charles G. Fenwick, that North American writers have tended to
treat the Monroe Doctrine under the heading of self-defense, while Hispanic American
publicists have customarily dealt with the same subject matter under the heading of
non-intervention. Fenwick, Intervention: Individual and Collective, 39 AM. J. INT'L L.
645, 649 (1945).
10. BEMIS, op. cit. supra note 9, at 237.
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nature, to prevent European intervention. It would not only secure
a renunciation of the right of intervention as commonly understood
by the law of nations in the global or universal sense; it also would
line the United States up against the right of intervention in the
New World by a non-American state, even to protect its subjects
against denial of justice.11

Although efforts to codify international law ordinarily engage
only the interest of specialists, one notable exception was the Latin
American movement for the codification of public international
law in the Western Hemisphere, a movement that has exercised a
profound and prolonged influence on the life of the American continent and which constitutes a unique chapter in the history of
international relations. The success of this movement constituted the
major political triumph of the Latin American states in the second
quarter of the twentieth century. In a series of historic conferences
in the 1930's, the American republics codified the United States'
renunciation of its claim to be competent to exercise an international
police power in the Western Hemisphere and its acceptance of the
doctrine of absolute non-intervention.12 At the Inter-American Con11. Id. at 237-38.
12. The Drago Doctrine-that "the public debt [of an American state] cannot
occasion armed intervention nor even the actual occupation of the territory of American nations by a European power"-was put forward as a corollary to the Monroe
Doctrine by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Argentina during the Venezuelan debt
controversy with Great Britain, Germany, and Italy (1902). For the text of the Drago
Doctrine, as embodied in Drago's instructions to the Argentine minister to the United
States, see 1903 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES I, reprinted in 1 AM. J.
INT'L L. 1 (Supp. 1907). For an illuminating interpretation of the significance of the
Drago Doctrine in the context of the historical growth of the "Western Hemisphere
Idea," see 'WHITAKER, THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE IDEA: ITS RISE AND DECLINE 86-107
(1954). Subject to an obligation on the part of a debtor state to accept an offer of
arbitration, the doctrine was accepted at the Second Hague Conference (1907). However, this condition proved unacceptable to a majority of Latin American states. These
states were unwilling to accept any qualifications upon the prohibition of armed force,
intervention, or the occupation of an American state. See BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC
PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD 308-25 (1915); SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE OF
1899 AND 1907, at 386-422 (1909); Drago, State Loans in Their Relation to International
Policy, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 692 (1907).
At the Havana Conference of 1928, the United States' opposition compelled the
withdrawal of a draft treaty that enunciated the principle that no state had the
right to intervene in the internal affairs of an American republic. But at the Seventh
International Conference of American States, held in Montevideo in 1933, the United
States joined the Latin American states in adherence to the Convention on Rights
and Duties of States. Article 8 of the convention read as follows: "No state has the
right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another." This instrument
marked the first occasion on which the United States had accepted the non-intervention doctrine. Although the United States issued a reservation of its rights by
"the law of nations as generally recognized," casting some small doubt on the extent
of its commitment to the principle adopted at Montevideo, the breakthrough for the
Latin Americans and the trend of North American policy was confirmed by the
subsequent withdrawal of United States armed forces or other forms of direct political
control from Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Cuba. Shortly before the inaugura-
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ference on Problems of War and Peace, held in Mexico City in early
1945 to lay the groundwork for the post-war reorganization of the
inter-American system, the American republics were able to declare
that the principle of non-intervention proclaimed at the Montevideo
Conference of 1933 and the Buenos Aires Conference of 1936 now
constituted a part of the international law of the New World.18
The success of the codification movement was in large part the
result of the efforts of tenacious Latin American jurists such as
Alvarez, and of sympathizers and allies in numerous North American
organizations and foundations which were devoted to the cause of
peace and the development of international law.14 Equally important
to the success of the movement were the ebbing of imperialist sentiment in the United States and the growing conviction among North
tion of President Franklin Roosevelt, the Hoover administtation had ordered the
withdrawal of United States troops from Nicaragua CTanuary 1933).
At the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, held in 1936 in
Buenos Aires, whatever doubts may have existed after 1933 about the meaning of
the United States' reservation at Montevideo were wiped away by its acceptance of the
Additional Protocol Relative to Non-Intervention, which explicitly re-affirmed the doctrine set forth at Montevideo, and in its first article declared "inadmissible the in•
tervention of any [High Contracting Party], directly or indirectly, and for whatever
reason, in the internal or external affairs of any other of the Parties." The doctrine
of non-intervention was re-affirmed still again, and the Drago Doctrine's proscription
of "forcible collection of pecuniary debts" was re-asserted, in the Declaration of
Principles of Inter-American Solidarity and Cooperation, promulgated at the Buenos
Aires Conference.
In the Declaration of American Principles issued by the Eighth International
Conference of American States, held in Lim.a in 1988, the American republics recommitted themselves to the principle that "the intervention of any State in the
internal or external affairs of another is inadmissible."
The Montevideo, Buenos Aires, and Lima conferences codified what some authors
have called the doctrine of absolute non-intervention. This statement of the doctrine is
presumably intended to convey the unique formulation given to the principle of
non-intervention in the international law of the Western Hemisphere-one which
is explicitly and deliberately designed to prohibit the various forms of intervention
permitted under universal customary international law.
The texts of the pertinent documents of the Montevideo, Buenos Aires, and Lima
conferences are conveniently brought together in THE EVOLUTION OF OUll LA11N
A11muCAN PouCY: A DOCUMENTARY REcoRD app. A (Gantenbein ed. 1950).
13. See Preamble to the Act of Chapultepec arts. 5(B) &: (G), in 12 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 339 (1945), reprinted in 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 108 (Supp. 1945).
14. Among the notable Latin American advocates of codification of "American
international law" were Judge Alvarez and Judge Antonio Sanchez de Bustamante y
Sirven. Another was Dr. Jose G. Guerrero, also a member of the World Court, The
North Americans included Elihu Root, the Secretary of State in the administration
of Theodore Roosevelt, a long-time president of the American Society of International
Law and a leading proponent of United States commitment to international arbitral
and judicial procedures. Another, and perhaps the most important of all, was Dr.
James Brown Scott. A close friend and collaborator of Alvarez, and a former solicitor
of the Department of State, Dr. Scott served for many years as secretary of the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and president of the American Institute
of International Law, an adjunct of the Endowment devoted to the promotion and
codification of "American international law." He served for more than thirty years
as an editor of the American Journal of International Law.
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American intellectuals and statesmen that intervention had failed to
cure the social and political ailments of the Latin American republics
and had failed to accomplish the United States' basic policy objectives. Although the United States remained committed to the political
and strategic doctrine that the security of the Western Hemisphere
and the security of the United States were indivisible, the rise of
aggressive totalitarian regimes in Europe and Asia further emphasized the need for unity in the Americas. The "good neighbor" policy
to which Franklin Roosevelt dedicated the United States in his 1933
inaugural address recognized that the most effective means of achieving the hemispheric unity deemed essential to the United States'
national security was to enlist the positive cooperation of the Latin
American states in a common resistance to intervention by extracontinental powers. Not surprisingly, therefore, the repudiation of
the unilateral claim to the right of intervention and the acceptance of
the doctrine of absolute non-intervention by the United States was
directly related to the development (at the urging of the United
States) of a system of mutual consultation on matters affecting the
peace of the hemisphere. The system of consultation established in
the late 1930's formed the basis of the mutual security system organized after the war to "panamericanize" or "multilateralize" the
basic political and strategic tenets of the Monroe Doctrine. One
eminent student of the American regional system of public order
accurately assessed the inter-relationship of the codification of the
doctrine of non-intervention and the development of the regional
system of collective defense when he wrote:
One of the most important factors, if not the most important factor
in bringing about the change of policy on the part of the United
States was doubtless the adoption, at the same Buenos Aires Conference, of the provisions for general "consultation."15

To the apparent satisfaction of both the United States and the states
of Latin America, the inter-American system as constituted after the
Second World War rested on the twin pillars of non-intervention
and hemispheric security.
II.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM

In the years after World War II, as the American republics proceeded to organize a regional system of public order, the Latin
American states continued to be as much concerned with the re15. Fenwick, supra note 9, at 656. For a concurring view, and an incisive examination of the relationship of the renunciation of intervention and the evolution of
"collective intervention," see Falk, The Legitimacy of Legislative Intervention by the
United Nations, in EssAYs ON INTERVENTION 81, 86 (Stanger ed. 1964).
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affirmation and re-codification of the doctrine of non-intervention as
they were with the creation of a system of collective defense. Neither
the establishment of a world organization based upon the principles
of the sovereign equality of states and the prohibition of the use of
force against a state's territorial integrity or independence, nor the
freedom-protecting character of the United States' new global role,
were sufficient to assuage the traditional Latin American concern for
legal protection from hegemonic interventionism. The days of
Manifest Destiny were not so distant, and the success of the movement against M onro{smo was all too recent, for the Latin Americans
to abandon their efforts to codify the legal principles they deemed
vital to their security and independence.

A. The Enthronement of the Doctrine of Non-Intervention
The Charter of the OAS (1948),16 pursuant to which the consultative machinery of the pre-war Pan Americanism was re-organized as
a "regional arrangement" under the United Nations, codified once
again the American international law doctrine of non-intervention.
Articles 15 and 17 of the Charter give the doctrine its broadest
formulation:
Art. 15: No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever~ in the internal
or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form
of interference or attempted threat against the personality
of the State or against its political, economic and cultural
elements.
Art. 17: The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other
measures of force taken by another State, directly or indirectly, on any ground whatsoever. No territorial acquisition or special advantages obtained either by force or by
other means of coercion shall be recognized.17

The other keystone of the modern inter-American system is provided
by chapter V of the Charter, which incorporates by reference the
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947 (the socalled "Rio Treaty"). 18 As a result, the OAS may be regarded as both
a "regional arrangement" under the United Nations Charter and an
16. For a convenient text, see 46 AM. J.
17. Id. at 46-47. (Emphasis added.)
18. 21 U.N.T.S. 77, 62 Stat. 1681 (1948).

!NT'L

L. 43 (Supp. 1952).
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organization for collective self-defense. The manifold implications
of this dual role, and the extent to which the OAS may lawfully act
to enforce its decisions with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security without the authorization of the Security
Council of the United Nations, remain a subject of considerable
controversy.18 They do not, however, directly concern us at this time.
19. Under the Charter of the United Nations, a distinction may be drawn between
"collective self-defense" organizations and so-called "regional arrangements." Article
51 of the Charter provides that nothing in the Charter "shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations." International organizations constituted under this
provision, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Treaty
Organization, are required to report only to the Security Council on "measures taken
in exercise of this right of self-defense." Chapter VIII of the Charter (articles 52-54),
on the other hand, recognizes the complementary role of "regional arrangements or
agencies" in "such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and
security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or
agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the
United Nations." Drafted in San Francisco to accommodate the demands of the states
of the inter-American system for a special role in maintaining the peace and security
of the Western Hemisphere, chapter VIII seeks to reach a compromise between the
divergent demands of "regionalists" and "globalists." While article 24 of the Charter
accords to the Security Council "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" (emphasis added), chapter VIII envisions prior recourse
to an appropriate regional agency in the case of "local disputes." Under chapter VIII,
moreover, provision is made for the use by the Security Council of regional agencies
for enforcement action "under its [i.e., the Security Council's] authority," and enforcement action by a regional agency without the authorization of the Council is
prohibited.
The fundamental question of the extent to which a regional arrangement may
operate independently of the universal organization has attracted much attention in
recent years, particularly after the adoption of coercive measures by the OAS against
the Dominican Republic (1960) and Cuba (1962) and the launching of "peacekeeping
operations" in the Dominican Republic in 1965-1966. The discussion has centered on
several related issues: whether action taken by the OAS constitutes "enforcement
action" so as to require the authorization of the Security Council; whether, if it is
to be considered "enforcement action," the Charter requires prior authorization by
the Council; and whether the failure of the Security Council to take any action
with respect to enforcement action undertaken by a regional agency (because of a
veto or the threat of a veto by one of the permanent members) may be deemed to
constitute authorization. In the case of the OAS, the matter is complicated by the
additional factor that the inter-American system is organized not only as a "regional
arrangement," but also, under the Rio Treaty of 1947, as a "collective self-defense"
organization. The former Legal Adviser of the Department of State has likened the
OAS to a "junior grade U.N." whose diplomatic and economic sanctions do not
constitute "enforcement action" under the UN Charter and do not, therefore, require
the authorization of the Security Council. He has offered the OAS as an "obvious
candidate for the peacekeeping role within its regional terms of reference" in the
light of the paralysis of the Security Council occasioned by the use or threat of the
veto. See Remarks of Mr. Abram Chayes, then Legal Adviser of the Department of
State, in The Inter-American Security System and the Cuban Crisis, .BACKGROUND
PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF nm THIRD HAMMARSKJOLD FORUM 37, 47-48 (Tondel ed.
1964). Others have noted the OAS' similarities to NATO and the Warsaw Treaty
Organization and have doubted the wisdom of according to such an organization
the freedom of action that Mr. Chayes would allow to a putative "junior grade U.N."
For discussions of the general problem, see ibid.; BEcKErr, THE Noam: ATI.AlllTic
TREATY', THE .BRtlSSEI.S TREATY', AND THE C!LutTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1950);
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For our present purposes it may be sufficient to note that the individual and collective measures that may be taken under the Rio
Treaty were intended to be limited to cases in which a state is subjected to armed aggression, or to cases not involving armed aggression
but affecting "the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the
sovereignty or political independence of any American state...." 20
It is apparent from its constituent instruments that, in its early
years, the post-war inter-American system was primarily concerned
with the maintenance by each state of absolute and exclusive authority over its own territory, free of extra-continental or intra-continental intervention. It also seems clear that those who signed the
OAS Charter in 1948 did not imagine that the OAS would be empowered to undertake "multilateral intervention" or "collective
security action" against a member state of the Organization, except
perhaps in the limited instance where a state's non-compliance with
BOWETI, THE LAw OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 135-38, 186-87 (1964 ed.); HIGGINS,
THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE
UNITED NATIONS 169-70 (1963); Behr, Regional Organi:i:ations: A United Nations Problem, 49 AM. J. INT'L L. 166 (1955); Halderman, Regional Enforcement .Measures and
the United Nations, 52 GEo. L.J. 89 (1963). For the professedly "pragmatic" or
non-"fundamentalist" view, assertedly based on the "working precepts of the American
constitutional lawyer," one must tum to the speeches and writings of Professor Abram
Chayes and Mr. Leonard Meeker, the present Legal Adviser of the Department of
State. See Remarks of Mr. Abram Chayes, op. cit. supra; Chayes, The Legal Case for
the U.S. Action in Cuba, 47 DEP'T STATE BuLL, 763 (1962); Remarks by Abram Chayes,
1963 A.S.I.L. PROCEEDINGS 10; Meeker, Defensive Quarantine and the Law, 57 AM. J.
INT'L L. 515 (1963); Meeker, The Dominican Situation in the Perspective of International Law, 53 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 60 (1965). The subject is viewed from a different
perspective by Henkin, Force, Intervention and Neutrality in Contemporary International Law, 1963 A.S.I.L. PROCEEDINGS 147, and Friedmann, United States Policy and
the Crisis of International Law, 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 857 (1965). Professor Friedmann's
article is a forceful critique of the Chayes-Meeker approach.
20. Article 6 of the Rio Treaty, 21 U.N.T.S. 97 &: 99, 62 Stat. 1683 (1948). "In other
words, the framers of the [Rio] Treaty did not intend to put into effect the sanctions
enumerated in [article 6] unless the circumstances were of a serious and urgent
character pressing, in a sense, upon the very political existence of the state." Fenwick,
The Issues at Punta del Este: Non-Intervention v. Collective Security, 56 AM. J. !NT'L
L. 469, 471 (1962). The Rio Treaty, as a recent but yet unpublished study of the concept
of self-defense in the inter-American system has concluded,
was not meant to provide .•• a sanctioning competence for the Inter-American
System, but to build a structure for self-defence. Yet its application has been quite
different, for the Treaty ·has been used more and more as a substitute for collective security action and collective sanctions, becoming nowadays a punitive
machinery and a device to redress the "wrong" done, even if no attempt has been
made ••• to show that the OAS was faced by illegal conduct of the State concerned.
Sepulveda, The Development of the Concept of Collective Self-Defence in the Practice of the Organization of American States (Dissertation submitted for the Diploma
in International Law in the University of Cambridge, 1966). In any event, it should
be noted that the Rio Treaty calls for individual action (as well as consultation) only
in the case of an armed attack upon an American state. Article 6, encompassing any
"fact or situation" other than an armed attack, and invoked by some in defense of
the United States' unilateral action in the Dominican Republic in 1965, provides a
basis only for consultation, and for collective action, at most.
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the doctrine of non-intervention compelled corrective action by the
OAS in order to sustain the doctrine. The scope of permissible
"multilateral intervention" would presumably be limited further
by article 17's explicit and blanket proscription of military occupation of a state-even temporarily and on any ground whatsoever.
Unlike the UN Charter, the OAS Charter makes only the most
cursory mention of human rights. Moreover, the scant references that
do appear do not arise in any context which might conceivably be
regarded as qualifying the doctrine of non-intervention. Rather,
human rights are mentioned only in the ritualistic manner that has
become a familiar, but meaningless, part of the pronouncements of
international institutions since the end of World War II. While
blandly proclaiming as a principle of the inter-American system "the
fundamental rights of the individual without distinction as to race,
nationality, creed or sex,"21 the Charter does not indicate that either
the promotion or the protection of human rights is one of the
regional agency's purposes. It neither makes reference to, nor appears
to envisage the creation of, a body within the Organization devoted
exclusively to matters of human rights. It is significant that the
principle of non-intervention apparently was intended to apply to
the OAS itself, as well as to its individual members. 22 And it is also
noteworthy that when the American republics were called upon to
consider two draft statements of principles drawn up by the InterAmerican Juridical Committee for the Bogota Conference of 1948one statement setting forth the "fundamental rights and duties of
states" (including, inter alia, the doctrine of non-intervention), the
other stating "the rights and duties of man"-they chose to incorporate the first but not the second into the OAS Charter. The statement
of principles on human rights was issued separately as the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. 23
The constituent instruments of the inter-American system reveal
the unwillingness of the Latin American states to qualify the prin21. Article 5(j) of the OAS Charter, reprinted in 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 43 (Supp. 1952).
22. One critic of the doctrine of absolute non-intervention has reluctantly concluded:
Whether one regards the OAS as a jural personality distinct from the legal personalities of the individual states of which it is composed or merely as an associated
group of states having no existence apart from its members, it is clear that the
organization as well as its members is bound by the principle of non-intervention.
Thomas, Non-Intervention and Public Order in the Americas, PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM.
Soc'y OF INT'L L. 72, 75 (1959). Elsewhere the same author has concluded that as a
result of the OAS' apparent proscription of all forms of intervention "human rights are
now less protected than they were under general international law." THOMAS &:
THOMAS, NON-INTERVENTION: THE LAW AND ITS IMPORT IN THE AMERICAS 390 (1956).
23. Op. cit. supra note I; see Fenwick, The Ninth International Conference of
American States, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 553, 563 (1948).
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ciple of non-intervention any more than is absolutely required by a
collective defense system. If, as Professor Thomas has argued, the
"absolute doctrine [of non-intervention] creates difficulties for a system of public order ... [because] [i]t makes impossible the complete
protection through the legal process of 'basic goal values' of the
community"24-which he takes to include human rights and representative democracy-one must conclude either that the doctrine of
absolute non-intervention was specifically intended to create just
such difficulties or that these "basic goal values" were not deemed
sufficiently clear or compelling to warrant a provision for protective
intervention. Without unduly stretching the limits of credibility,
one might consider the possibility that the doctrine of absolute nonintervention was simply intended to prevent the hemisphere's dominant power, or a group of states allied to that power, from deciding
what these "basic goal values" are and then compelling conformity
from the other states in the inter-American system. Moreover, there
is considerable evidence to contradict the proposition that the promotion or protection of human rights and representative democracy
in the member states was an avowed "goal value" of the OAS. The
all-embracing provisions on non-intervention in the OAS Charter
and the evident lack of enthusiasm of its drafters for giving the
regional agency a human rights role merely confirmed the defeat
several years earlier of the so-called Rodriguez Larreta Doctrine,
which would have permitted multilateral intervention in cases where
the violations of human rights were deemed to affect the peace of the
Americas. As J. C. Dreier has observed: "The potential dangers inherent in permitting any kind of intervention were considered
greater than the evils which intervention under the Rodriguez
Larreta Doctrine was intended to correct." 25 Thus, during the years
24. Thomas, Non-Intervention and Public Order in the Americas, PROCEEDINGS OF

nm AM. Soc'y OF INT'L L. 72, 73 (1959).
25. DREIER, THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES AND THE HEMISPHERE CRISIS 95
(1962). The proposal of Dr. Rodriguez Larreta, the Foreign Minister of Uruguay, for
"multilateral intervention" in defense of human rights, was contained in a note sent
to all of the American republics in November 1945. It constituted a thinly-veiled condemnation of the Per6n regime of Argentina and envisaged consultations and collective action against governments which violated American "democratic solidarity" and
fundamental freedoms. Although the United States was apparently somewhat recep•
tive to the proposal, only three Latin American states (Guatemala, Panama, and
Venezuela) supported the Uruguayan initiative. See RONNING, LAW AND PoLITICS IN
INTER-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 68-69, 80 (1963). A related development was the rejection
by the Mexico City Conference in 1945 of a Guatemalan proposal that the American
states resolve not to recognize "anti-democratic" governments. This relatively modest
form of "multilateral intervention" was similarly rejected as inconsistent with the
American law of non-intervention. The task of defining "democratic" and "anti•
democratic" regimes was regarded as too subjective and unworkable. Ball, Issue for
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between the Bogota Conference, which established the Organization,
and the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs
in Santiago, Chile, in 1959, the OAS' indifference toward a human
rights program closely paralleled its own generally strict adherence
to the principle of non-intervention. 26
It should be mentioned that one small spark of interest in a
human rights role for the regional agency had been revealed in 1948
by the promulgation of the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man and the adoption of a recommendation that human
rights be protected by a juridical organ and that "where internationally recognized rights are concerned, juridical protection, to
be effective, should emanate from an international organ."27 In
addition, the Inter-American Juridical Committee was asked to prepare a draft statute for an Inter-American Court for the Protection
of the Rights of Man. 28 However, the vagueness of the resolution, the
haphazard manner of its adoption, and the subsequent relegation of
the Americas: Non-Intervention v. Human Rights and the Preservation of Democratic
Institutions, 15 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 21, 22-23 (1961). On more recent efforts
to revive the idea of collective action, in the form of non-recognition, against regimes
that have seized power from democratically-elected and constitutional governments,
see Fenwick, The Recognition of De Facto Governments: Is There a Basis for InterAmerican Collective Action?, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 109 (1964). Apparently oblivious to
these revealing decisions with respect to multilateral action in defense of human
rights and democratic institutions, Professor Macdonald has categorically asserted
that "there is no doubt that the O.A.S. can take common action to protect human
rights under article 19 [of the OAS Charter]." Macdonald, The Organization of
American States in Action, 15 U. TORONTO L.J. 359-70 (1964). Article 19 of the
OAS Charter states that "Measures adopted for the maintenance of peace and security
in accordance with existing treaties do not constitute a violation of the principles
set forth in Articles 15 and 17 [on non-intervention and territorial inviolability,
respectively]." However, the very fact that the enforcement measures permitted by
the Rio Treaty and the United Nations Charter are thereby excluded from the doctrine
of non-intervention as formulated in the OAS Charter has convinced Professor
Thomas of the intention of the framers to bind the OAS itself to the doctrine of nonintervention in matters not directly related to enforcement measures or the inherent
right of self-defense. Thomas, Non-Intervention and Public Order in the Americas,
PROCEEDINGS OF nm AM. Soc'y OF INT'L L. 72, 75 (1959).
26. This is not to suggest that the OAS had, until then, effectively prevented the
alleged interventionist acts of member states, but merely that the Organization itself
had remained generally free of charges of interventionism.
27. Resolution XX.XI, Ninth International Conference of American States, 13ogota,
Colombia, March 30-May 2, 1948, Final Act (Pan-American Union 1948), p. 45, quoted
in Fenwick, The Ninth International Conference of American States, 42 AM. J. INT'L L.
553, 563 (1948); sec Inter-American Juridical Committee, Report to the Inter-American
Council of Jurists Concerning Resolution XXXI of the Bogota Conference (InterAmerican Court To Protect the Rights of Man), reprinted in ANUARIO JURIDICO INTER·
AMERICA.NO, 1949, at 298 (1950).
28. Resolution XXXI, Ninth International Conference of American States, op. cit.
supra note 27. See also Freeman, The First Meeting of the Inter-American Council of
Jurists, 44 AM. J. INT'L L. 374-, 380 (1950); Kunz, The Bogota Charter and the Organization of American States, 42 A?.r. J. INT'L L. 568, 573 (1948).
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the subject to a position of insignificance in the work program of the
OAS' juridical bodies made it apparent that the proposal was not
intended to be taken very seriously. Indeed, the draft statute that the
Inter-American Juridical Committee was asked to prepare was not
to be considered by a ministerial-level conference until its submission to the next Inter-American Conference, scheduled for five years
later, and even then, it was merely to be "studied" by that Conference. Consequently, this one spark of interest in a human rights
program was quickly dashed by the Inter-American Juridical Committee, which reported unanimously to the Inter-American Council
of Jurists (its parent body) that, in the absence of a body of positive
law that might serve as a basis for developing measures of implementation, the Committee would be unable to prepare the draft statute
requested by the Bogota Conference.29 Clearly, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man was not regarded as a sufficient foundation on which to build.
In their movement to codify, in much-expanded form, the doctrine of non-intervention enunciated by Drago, the Latin Americans
had effectively prohibited only the more obvious forms of "intervention." However, their efforts to codify the much broader principle
of non-intervention formulated by Calvo, which in its strictest form
would prohibit recourse by aliens to diplomatic interposition in any
matter justiciable in an American republic, were begun as early as
the first Pan American Conference in 1889. Moreover, despite the
firm and continued opposition of the United States and the great
majority of non-Latin American authorities in international law,
Latin American states have persistently adhered to the Calvo Doctrine, have embodied it in countless constitutions, and have continued to make frequent use of it (through the so-called "Calvo
Clause") in concession agreements with foreign corporations.30 Indeed, their efforts to codify the Calvo Doctrine as a principle of
29. Inter-American Juridical Committee, supra note 27; Freeman, supra note 28,
at 381.
30. See .BORCHARD, op. cit. supra note 12, at 792; 1 CALVO, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE §§ 204-05 (5th ed. 1896); 3 id. § 1278; 6 id. § 256. An early
and classic statement of the Calvo Doctrine is offered by Harmodio Arias (later
president of the Republic of Panama), The Non-Liability of States for Damages
Suffered by Foreigners in the Course of a Riot, an Insurrection, or a Civil War, 7 AM.
J. INT'L L. 724 (1913). See also Freeman, Recent Aspects of the Calvo Doctrine and
the Challenge to International Law, 40 AM. J. INT'L L. 121 (1946); Lipstein, The Place
of the Calvo Clause in International Law, 1945 13RIT. YB. INT'L L. 130. Professor Paul
Henri Laurent has traced the origins of the doctrine attributed to Calvo to indemnification cases arising from the 13elgian independence war of 1830. Laurent, State
Responsibility: A Possible Historic Precedent to the Calvo Clause, 15 !NT'L &: CoMP.
L,Q. 395 (1966).
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American international law continued unabated after the successful
codification of the narrower principle of non-intervention and have
persisted to this day as one of their major political objectives.
As recently as September, 1965, a juridical body of the OAS
re-affirmed in the strongest terms the principle that, in the Western
Hemisphere, there exists no duty imposed by international law that
aliens be given treatment in any wise different from that accorded
to nationals. The Inter-American Juridical Committee re-asserted
the traditional Latin American reluctance to have their municipal
administration of justice judged by any standard other than their
own and strenuously rejected the theory of state responsibility for
a denial of justice to aliens.81 It pointedly declared: "In contrast to
the Latin American position, that of the United States is one of continuing to apply nineteenth-century standards set by the European
powers, in order to assure a privileged status to foreign firms and to
their nationals settled or domiciled abroad." 82 Identifying the Latin
American viewpoint with that of other "new countries," the Committee added:
There is no novelty in the United States position regarding standards
that have been praised by the greater powers, standards that their
jurists classify as part of universal international law, or simply, with
unparalleled modesty, as international law itself.
In these circumstances, those who stubbornly hold to obsolete ideas
that are now totally without foundation-if they ever had any, from
the moral point of view-can make no contribution to the development of international law in the subject of which we speak. Rather,
the contribution must be made by those who want to establish a different structure that will take into account the presence in the world
of new countries and new situations.ss
Viewed from the perspective of the historic commitment of the
Latin American states to a doctrine of non-intervention that some
have come to regard as a doctrine of international irresponsibility, 84
31. Inter-American Juridical Committee, Contribution of the American Continent
to the Principles of International Law That Govern the Responsibility of the State,
OAS OFFICIAL REcoRDs, OEA/Ser. I/VI.2 (English), CIJ-78 (Sept. 1965). On the work
of the Inter-American Juridical Committee and its parent body, see Freeman, The
Contribution of the Inter-American Juridical Committee and the Inter-American
Council of Jurists to the Codification and Development of International Law, PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM. Soc'y OF INT'L L. 14 (1965).
32. Inter-American Juridical Committee, op. dt. supra note 31, at 5.
33. Id. at 5-6. (Emphasis added.)
34. See, e.g., the views of Freeman in Recent Aspects of the Calvo Doctrine and the
Challenge to International Law, 40 AM. J. INT'L L. 121 (1946); and in The Contribution
of the Inter-American Juridical Committee and the Inter-American Council of Jurists
to the Codification and Development of International Law, PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM.
Soc'y OF INT'L L. 21-22 (1965); and the dissehting views of Professor James O. Murdock,
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it is not difficult to comprehend why, as late as 1959, the interAmerican system remained relatively unconcerned with the promotion of human rights and representative democracy in member states.
However, in 1959, certain events occurred which altered that
situation.

B. The Decline of Absolute Non-Intervention
The OAS' indifference toward human rights problems first
showed significant signs of breaking down in August, 1959, when the
Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs was
convened in Santiago, Chile, to consider the political tension in the
Caribbean area. The Santiago conference was primarily concerned
with Venezuela's charge that the Trujillo regime of the Dominican
Republic had attempted to undermine the government of Venezuela
and to assassinate its chief executive. For the previous three decades,
the Trujillo government had been the eyesore of the American continent, but, undoubtedly because Trujilloism was not an expansionist idealogy and had remained an insular phenomenon, the OAS had
never resolved (as it was later to do in the case of Cuban communism)
that the Dominican government was incompatible with the interAmerican system, and the OAS had never before considered corrective
action. However, the alleged external terrorist activities of the Trujillo regime began to turn the OAS toward the view that violations
of human rights and denials of democratic freedoms within member
states might affect the peace of the Americas and might thus become
a proper concern of the Organization. It is important to stress, however, that it was the Dominican regime's alleged violation of the nonintervention doctrine itself that first prompted the OAS to examine
its role in promoting respect for human rights.
As the preamble to the Declaration of Santiago indicates, the
representatives to the Fifth Meeting of Consultation concluded that
the peace of the Americas "can be effective only insofar as human
rights and fundamental freedoms and the exercise of representative
democracy are a reality within each one of them." 35 They decided
the North American member of the Inter-American Juridical Committee, in Contribution of the American Continent to the Principles of International Law That Govern
the Responsibility of the State, OAS OFFICIAL RECORDS, OEA/Ser. I/VI.2 (English),
CIJ-61 (Jan. 1962).
35. Declaration of Santiago, Chile (1959), OAS, Fifth Meeting of Consultation of
Ministers of Foreign Affairs Aug. 12-18, 1959, Final Act, OEA/Ser. C/II.5 (English), p. 5,
reprinted in 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 537, 538 (1961). The charges against the Trujillo regime
were referred to the Inter-American Peace Committee, which reported in June 1960
that "flagrant and widespread violations of human rights" in the Dominican Republic
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that treaty obligations insuring respect for human rights and representative democracy were wanting3 6 and consequently asked the InterAmerican Council of Jurists to prepare a draft Inter-American Convention on Human Rights modeled after the work of the United
Nations and the Council of Europe. The Council was also asked to
prepare an instrument creating an Inter-American Court for the
Protection of Human Rights37 and it was resolved to establish an
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, composed of seven
members elected in their individual capacity by the OAS Council.38
The mandate of the new Commission was vague-"to promote
respect for human rights" and to "develop an awareness of human
rights among the peoples of America"-and the OAS Council was
assigned the task of preparing the Commission's statute.
The Inter-American Council of Jurists, meeting in Santiago after
the Meeting of Consultation, promptly prepared a draft convention
on human rights, including a separate chapter on civil and political
rights and another on economic, social, and cultural rights. The draft
convention provided for an Inter-American Commission for the
had aggravated international tensions in the Caribbean, and concluded that the
Dominican Republic had been guilty of "acts of intervention and aggression" against
Venezuela. In August 1960, the Organ of Consultation of the OAS, in its first sub•
stantial departure from the doctrine of absolute non-intervention, imposed sanctions
for the first time on a member of the organization. It is siguificant that, in this first
departure from the doctrine, the issue of human rights violations by the Dominican
regime was very much intertwined with the larger question of aggression and intervention by the Trujillo government. For the text of the Organ's resolution, see 43
DEP'T STATE BULL. 358 (1960). See generally .Ball, supra note 25.
36. Citing the work of the United Nations and the Council of Europe, the Meeting
concluded "that eleven years after the proclamation of the American Declaration of
the Rights and Duties of man, ••• the climate in this hemisphere is ready for the
conclusion of a convention •.• .'' Declaration of Santiago, Chile, supra note 35, at 11,
quoted in ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE 174 (1963).
37. Declaration of Santiago, Chile, Resolution VIII, Part I, op. cit. supra note 35,
at 11, reprinted in OAS, Annual Report of the Secretary-General to the Council of the
Organization, OEA/Ser. D /III.12 (English) (1960), p. 21. The Meeting had groped
for a formula that would, in the words of Secretary of State Christian A. Herter,
"harmonize the common desire to preserve human rights inviolate with absolute respect
for the principle of non-intervention." The Times (London), Aug. 13, 1959, p. 8, col. 4.
See also id., Aug. 19 & 21, 1959. "The Latin Americans," Miss .Ball has quite accurately noted, "have not always recognized the existence of a conflict, or potential conflict, between the principle of non-intervention and the protection of
human rights and democratic institutions.'' .Ball, supra note 25, at 29. This is amply
verified by the work of the Inter-American Juridical Committee over the decades. See,
e.g., Inter-American Juridical Committee, Differences Between Intervention and Collective Action, OAS OFFICIAL REcoRDs, OEA/Ser. I/VI.2 (English), CIJ-81 (Jan. 1966). .But
in view of the position taken by the Secretary of State of the United States in 1959, and
in the light of developments since 1959, the same conclusion would seem to be applicable to the North Americans as well. See note 70 infra.
38. Declaration of Santiago, Chile, Resolution VIII, Part II, op. cit. supra note 35,
at 11, reprinted in OAS, Annual Report of the Secretary-General to the Council of the
Organization, OEA/Scr. D/III.12 (English) (1960), p. 19.
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Protection of Human Rights and for an Inter-American Court of
Human Rights. These institutions were expected to function substantially like the comparable bodies in the human rights machinery
of the Council of Europe.
The draft convention floundered in different organs of the OAS
for seven years, and it was only at the Second Special Inter-American
Conference, held in Rio de Janeiro in November, 1965, that there
was some indication that it might soon emerge from the wilderness.
The Rio Conference sent the 1959 draft convention and two other
draft conventions offered by Chile and Uruguay to the Council of
the Organization, which was asked to consider the drafts, to hear
the views of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and
other interested organs, and to complete the necessary revisions of
the convention within one year. The Conference's resolution also
provides that, within three months of completion, the draft convention is to be submitted to governments for observations and suggested amendments. Within a further thirty days, the Council is to
convoke an Inter-American Specialized Conference to approve and
sign a convention on human rights.39
The Commission created at Santiago in 1959 assumed a surprisingly vigorous role in the fulfillment of its vague mandate to "promote
respect for human rights." The Council had not carefully defined
the Commission's precise role or its rules of procedure.40 Rather, it
merely stated that the Commission was to be "an autonomous entity
of the Organization of American States, the function of which is to
promote respect for human rights."41 Its functions and powers were
stated in similarly vague fashion, 42 and some of those omitted were
39. Second Special Inter-American Conference, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Nov. 17-30,
1965, Final Act, Resolution XXIV, OEA/Ser. C/I.13 (English). At last report, the
Commission on Human Rights had finished its consideration of the Draft Convention
and had submitted an opinion on it to the Council of the OAS, which is still considering the Draft Convention. Letter from Dr. Luis Reque, Executive Secretary of the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, to Jose Cabranes, March 22, 1967.
40. For the act authorizing the creation of the Commission, see OEA/Ser. L/V /I.I
(1960).
41. Id. art. I.
42. Id. art. 9, stating the Commission's functions and powers, deserves to be quoted
at length:
a. To develop an awareness of human rights among the peoples of America;
b. To make recommendations to the governments of the member states in general,
if it considers such action advisable, for the adoption of progressive measures
in favor of human rights within the framework of their domestic legislation
and, in accordance with their constitutional precepts, approprite measures to
further the faithful observance of those rights; [Emphasis added.]
c. To prepare such studies or reports as it considers advisable in the performance
of its duties;
d. To urge the governments of the member states to supply it with information
on the measures adopted by them in matters of human rights;
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at least as significant as those enumerated. Its mandate remained
the promotion of human rights; nothing was said of the protection
of these rights. Moreover, the important power to consider petitions
from individuals and organizations failed to gain the approval of the
Council.48
Under the circumstances, it was perhaps natural that the Commission should resort to improvisation in defining its role. At its first
session, it resolved to interpret its mandate broadly. While acknowledging that it was not "empowered to make any individual decision
regarding the written communications or claims that it receives involving the violation of human rights in the American states," the
Commission decided that "for the most effective fulfillment of its
functions, .•• [it would] take cognizance of them by way of information. "44 It thereupon interpreted article 9(b) of its statute to mean
that it could address general recommendations to individual members of the OAS (not merely to all of them collectively) based upon
the information it had obtained. Also at the first session, the Commission "took note" of thirty communications regarding alleged
violations of human rights in American states, thereby taking the
first cautious steps in the direction of the protection as well as the
promotion of human rights in the American continent. Yet the
Commission remained so dubious of its powers that it requested from
the outset that the OAS Council explicitly allow it to "examine communications or claims directed to it by any person or group of
persons."4IS Although this authority was not formally granted until
the Second Special Inter-American Conference of 1965,46 the Commission's procedure of "taking note" of petitions and addressing to
member states recommendations based upon them amounted to the
same thing. This practice had become so familiar by 1961 that the
Secretary-General of the OAS could casually observe that "from the
e. To serve the Organization of American States as an advisory body in respect
of human rights.
In the performance of its functions, the Commission is directed by article 10 to act
"in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Charter of the Organization and
bear in mind particularily that, in conformity with the American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man, the rights of each man are limited by the rights of
others ••••" OAS, Annual Report of the Secretary-General to the Council of the
Organization, OEA/Ser. D/IlI.12 (English) (1960), p. 19.
43. Scheman, The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 59 AM. J. INT'L L.
8!15, !188 (1965).
44. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Work Accom•
plished During Its First Session, October 3-28, 1960, OEA/Ser. L/V/Il.1, Doc. 82
(English), p. 18. (Emphasis added.)
·
45. Id. at 10.
46. Second Special Inter-American Conference, op. cit. supra note 88, Resolution
xxn. The text of the resolution appears at 60 AM. J. hrr'L L. 458 (1966).
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beginning [the Commission] attended to private individuals' petitions and protests on violations of human rights, both in Cuba and
the Dominican Republic."47
Thus, from its inception, the Commission became involved on an
ad hoc basis in the protection of fundamental rights during periods
of internal turmoil in member states. Alongside a modest program
devoted to the general study and promotion of human rights, 48 the
Commission has attempted on a case-by-case basis to use its information-gathering power, its authority to make recommendations to
states on measures that might be taken in favor of human rights
"within the framework of their domestic legislation,"49 and its discretionary power to make public its recommendations and conclusions, to protect human rights within member states. The Commission and its secretariat also have undertaken the task of compiling
information on alleged violations of human rights in member states.
Between the Commission's sessions, the secretariat devotes much of
its time to "attending to complaints and claims of violations of
human rights, as well as listing communications received in this
regard ...." 50 TJ?.e Commission has frequently heard oral testimony
of opposition groups and has followed up complaints against the
government of a member state by requesting relevant information.
It has also requested permission to hold sessions, for informational
47. OAS, Annual Report of the Secretary-General to the Council of the Organi:ation,
OEA/Ser. D/III.l!I, Introduction (1961). In 196!1 the Secretary-General of the OAS is
reported to have "pointed out that the work performed by the Commission responded
to the requirements of the American peoples, and that the organizations that were
created with vitality and greatness, as was the case with the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights, could not be limited by the simple device of regulations." He
reportedly went on to express confidence that the Commission would "extend its
activities in behalf of human rights and the effective exercise of democracy." InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Work Accomplished During
Its Sixth Session, April 16 to May 8, 196], OEA/Ser. L/V/ll.7, Doc. 28 (Aug. 21, 196!1),
p. 2. (Emphasis added.) Behind the Secretary-General's rhetoric lies a dear-cut recognition that the Commission's work was largely improvisatory and unfettered by any of
the statutes or regulations formulated by the political organs of the OAS.
48. The Commission's "work program" is, in reality, a program of special studies
undertaken by different members. They include, inter alia, "the political, economic,
and social conditions of the countries of Latin America that may influence human
rights;" "[the] relation between the promotion and protection of human rights and the
effective exercise of democracy;" and a "comparative study of the American Declaration
of the Rights and Duties of Man, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the
corresponding constitutional texts of the American States." Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights, Report on the Work Accomplished During Its Third Session,
October 2 to November 4, 1961, OEA/Ser. L/V /II.3, Doc. 82 (Nov. 4, 1961), pp. l!l-14.
49. See article 9(b) of the act authorizing the creation of the Commission, quoted
in note 42 supra.
50. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Work Accomplished During Its Third Session, October 2 to November 4, l961, OEA/Ser. L/VJIU,
Doc. 82 (Nov. 4, 1961), p. 8.
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purposes, in states charged with violating human rights, 51 and,
where it has deemed it necessary, the Commission has transmitted to
those states recommendations for corrective action.
The Commission's ad hoc approach to the protection of human
rights is best illustrated by its activities with respect to human rights
in Cuba and in the Dominican Republic. During its third session in
1961, the Commission sent a note to the Government of Cuba
requesting information "on some of the more urgent claims," and
suggested to that government that "if the imputations made to the
Commission were correct ... [it should] adopt 'progressive measures
favoring human rights' within Cuban domestic law." 52 Not long
thereafter, the Commission intervened in the aftermath of the abortive 1961 invasion of Cuba to request of the Cuban Government
that "the proceedings initiated against the prisoners of the Bay of Pigs
be in accordance with the obligations contained in Article 26 of the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man." 53 The
51. For example, in response to communications from Haitian exiles claiming wide•
spread violations of human rights in that republic, the Commission in 1962 requested
the permission of the Government of Haiti to hold part of its fifth session there.
This request was denied by the Foreign Minister of Haiti, who charged that the
Commission was interferring in the internal affairs of Haiti. In a subsequent note to
the Government of Haiti, the Commission re-asserted its constitutional authority to
undertake such visits, but grudgingly acquiesced in the face of the refusal of the
Haitian Government to grant its consent. A similar request was made in 1962 of the
Government of Nicaragna, which initially agreed to permit the Commission to sit
in the capital city of Managua, but not before the scheduled presidential elections
there (as the Commission had explicitly requested). Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, Report on the Work Accomplished During Its Fifth Session, September 24 to October 26, 1962, OEA/Ser. L/V/II.5, Doc. 40 (Feb. 18, 1963), pp. 7, 9, 10-12,
15. When the Nicaraguan Government refused a second request to visit Managua before
the Nicaraguan presidential election (in response to charges of intimidation of voters
and other violations of human rights), the Commission concluded that "the [Nicaraguan] Government did not look with sympathy upon the Commission's holding part
of its session on Nicaraguan territory for the purpose of ascertaining in reality whether
human rights were observed in that country," and expressed regret that it had been
prevented "from confirming whether the electoral process in Nicaragua was in accord
with the provisions of Article 20 of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties
of Man, approved at Bogota [in 1948] with the affirmative vote of Nicaragua." InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Work Accomplished During
Its First Special Session, January 2 to 23, 1963, OEA/Ser. L/V /11.6, Doc. 18 (April 25,
1963), p. 6.
52. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Work Accomplished During Its Third Session, October 2 to November 4, 1961, OEA/Ser. L/V/11.3,
Doc. 32 (Nov. 4, 1961), p. 10.
53. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation Regarding Human Rights in the Republic of Cuba, OEA/Ser. L/V /11.4, Doc. 30 (May I,
1962), pp. 6-7. Article 26 of the American Declaration, Resolution XXX, Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogota, Columbia, March 30-May 2, 1948,
Final Act (Pan-American Union 1948), p. 43, reprinted in 43 AM. J. INT'L L. 133
(Supp. 1949), reads:
Every accused person is presumed to be innocent until proved guilty.
Every person accused of an offense has the right to be given an impartial and
public hearing, and to be tried by courts previously established in accordance with

pre-existing law, and not to receive cruel, infamous or unusual punishment.
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Commission also asked that the Cuban Government refrain from
applying the death penalty to these prisoners. The Foreign Minister
of Cuba challenged the Commission's authority to propose the application of "alien norms to matters in the internal jurisdiction of
the Cuban Government" and denounced the Commission for its
readiness to intervene on behalf of the invaders while not commenting on the invasion itself. 54 The Commission replied
that it lacks competence to investigate the siutation referred to in the
second part of [the Cuban Foreign Minister's] communication, which
inures to the other organs of the Inter-american system; but it does
have competence to formulate recommendations to the governments
of the American states in cases such as those contemplated in the
cablegram to the Government of Cuba [that is, with respect to the
prisoners of the Bay of Pigs].55

Powerless to proceed any further with the matter, the Commission
merely made public its exchange of communications with the Cuban
Government and expressed "profound concern" that the proceedings
against the prisoners had apparently not conformed to article 26 of
'the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.
In 1962 the Commission formally requested permission from the
Cuban Government to hold one of its sessions in Cuba in pursuance
of its statutory fact-gathering function. This request went unanswered.58 In 1963, however, with the permission of the United States
Government, the Commission held its first special session in Miami,
Florida, where a subcommittee conducted hearings on the situation
of political prisoners and their families in Cuba, accumulating evidence from more than eighty exiled Cubans. The result was a long
report which embodied much of the testimony collected by the
Commission and enumerated instances of violations of human
rights.57 The report also charged the Cuban Government with lack
of cooperation.
The Commission's varied activities in the Dominican Republic
during the past several years is perhaps most illustrative of its capacity
to improvise while attempting to protect human rights during domestic political turmoil. In October, 1961, during a period of political
unrest following the assassination of Generalissimo Trujillo, the
54. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, op. cit. supra note 53, at 7,
55. Ibid.
56. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Work Accom•
plished During Its Fifth Session, September Z4 to October Z6, 196Z, OEA/Ser. L/V/II!,,
Doc. 40 (Feb. 18, 196!1), p. 16.
57. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of
Political Prisoners and Their Relatives in Cuba, OEA/Ser. L/V/II.7, Doc. 4 (May 17,
196!1).
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Commission was allowed to visit the Dominican Republic in order
"to enlarge its study of the situation regarding human rights in that
country with an on-the-spot analysis of facts denounced in numerous
communications."58 During its visit, the Commission conducted a
series of interviews with government and opposition groups in the
capital and in provincial cities; it received written and verbal complaints of violations of human rights; and, shortly before departing
for Washington, it gave the Dominican Foreign Ministry a list of
persons who were apparently under detention by the regime but
whose whereabouts were unknown. Upon its return to Washington,
the Commission drafted a note to the Government of the Dominican
Republic, bringing to its attention a series of abridgments of human
rights which were observed during its visit. 59 The Commission subsequently issued a report60 in which it condemned the regime of the
late Generalissimo Trujillo for "the most flagrant violations of
human rights" and noted that "serious violations continued" under
the incumbent regime of Dr. Joaquin Balaguer. 61
In late April, 1965, an uprising in the Dominican Republic precipitated the unilateral armed intervention of the United States.
This intervention, the first of its kind in more than three decades,
has at different times been supported by high officials of the United
States Government as a humanitarian intervention and as an effort
to prevent "the establishment of another communist government in
the Western Hemisphere." 62 The United States' action was subsequently approved by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers
of Foreign Affairs, which agreed to send a conciliation group to the
Dominican Republic. The Meeting subsequently established an
Inter-American Peace Force, whose purpose would be
that of co-operating in the restoration of normal conditions in the
Dominican Republic, in maintaining the security of its inhabitants
58. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Work Accomplished During Its Third Session, October 2 to November 4, 1961, OEA/Ser. L/V/Il.3,
Doc. 32 (Nov. 4, 1961), p. 4.
59. Id. at 6-7.
60. Report on the Situation Regarding Human Rights in the Dominican Republic,
OEA/Ser. L/V/II.4, Doc. 32 (May 22, 1962).
61. In 1963, a complaint to the OAS Secretary-General by four leaders of political
organizations in the Dominican Republic was referred to the Commission, which was
then in the midst of its sixth session. With the permission of the Dominican Government, the Commission travelled for a second time to the Dominican Republic. After
discussions with all sides to the controversy, the Commission withdrew without further
comment. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Work Accomplished During Its Sixth Session, April 16 to May 8, 1963, OEA/Ser. L/V/II.7, Doc. 28
(Aug. 21, 1963), p. 14.
62. The late Adlai E. Stevenson, then ambassador of the United States to the United
Nations, quoted in The Times (London), May 4, 1965, p. 12, col. 5.
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and the inviolability of human rights, and the establishment of an
atmosphere of peace and conciliation that will permit the functioning of democratic institutions.63

The events which led to the collapse of the doctrine of absolute
non-intervention and the full-bodied re-emergence of the doctrine
of "counter-intervention" were also the occasion for the most dramatic
and significant chapter in the seven-year history of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. On May 25, 1965, the SecretaryGeneral of the OAS requested that the Commission on Human
Rights send a delegation to Santo Domingo. Its presence was "essential and urgent," said the Secretary-General, "in view of numerous
denunciations of violations of human rights formulated by both
parties."64 By June l, 1965, the chairman and executive secretary of
the Commission had arrived to assist the other OAS groups in the
Dominican Republic in fulfilling the Organization's objective of
protecting human rights and establishing "an atmosphere . . . that
will permit the functioning of democratic institutions." The Commission's work was, necessarily, wholly improvised. It interviewed
representatives of both factions and secured their signatures on a
document which bound their "governments" to respect the principles embodied in the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man and "to provide the Commission with all the facilities
essential for the fulfillment of its mission." 65 The Commission visited
places of detention of both factions and, in some instances, procured
the release of prisoners; it negotiated permission for the unloading of
ships carrying food and medicines; it secured diplomatic asylum in
the embassies of other American republics for diverse political figures
and secured for others permission to leave the Dominican Republic.
In a report on his labors in the Dominican Republic, the chairman recommended that a "representation" of the Commission remain in that country "continuously, for the purpose of observing and
solving problems relating to human rights." 66 He later recommended
that the Commission remain in the Dominican Republic "in order
to watch over the rights of the individual in accordance with the
precepts of the Commission itself, and providing that it is so auth~63. OAS, Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Doc. 39
(English) Rev. Corr. (1965), reprinted in 52 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 863 (May 31, 1965), and
59 AM. J. INT'L L. 987 (1965); and in 4 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 594 (1965).
(Emphasis added.)
64. OAS, Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Situation
Regarding Human Rights in the Dominican Republic (Preliminary Report), OEA/Ser.
L/V /II.12, Doc. 2 Rev. Gune 23, 1965), p. I.
65. Id. at 5-6.
66. Id. at 22.
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rized by the provisional government that is established in the
Dominican Republic." 67 On September 27, 1965, the Provisional
Government of the Dominican Republic-constituted by an OASprocured agreement of all factions to govern the country until the
elections scheduled for June I, 1966-invited the Commission to
remain in the country until the freely elected government was installed in power. The Commission promptly accepted the invitation
to continue its informal efforts to protect human rights.
The Commission's role in the aftermath of the civil strife and
unilateral intervention of the United States has been described by
one of its own members, without undue exaggeration, as "the most
constructive contribution of the inter-American system in the Dominican Republic." 68 It is significant, however, that a report by the same
member on the Commission's work in the Dominican Republic, including a description of the legal bases for the Commission's activities
there, has been kept confidential, available only for the use of the
members of the Commission. 69
Nonetheless, the doubts which may have existed concerning the
Commission's improvisations over the past seven years appear to have
been largely dispelled by the action taken by the Second Special
Inter-American Conference, held in Rio de Janeiro in November,
1965.70 In effect, the Conference confirmed the powers which the
Commission had already exercised on the basis of its own liberal
interpretation of its statute.

III.

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

The new interest of the OAS in a program to promote human
rights in the Western Hemisphere has accompanied the erosion since
1959 of the doctrine of absolute non-intervention. Although the litany of absolute non-intervention continues to be sung in the foreign
ministries of all the American republics, regardless of their views
of the recent events, and although a high official of the Department
of State responsible for the direction of Latin American policy has
vigorously denied (even after the Dominican affair of 1965-1966) that
the doctrine of non-intervention is obsolete,71 there seems to be little
67. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Work Accomplished During Its Eleventh Session (Special), July 21 to 23, 1965, OEA/Ser. L/V/II.12,
Doc. 10 (Sept. 20, 1965), p. 6. (Emphasis added.)
68. Dr. Carlos Dunshee de Abranches of Brazil, in id. at 7.
69. Id. at 6.
70. Second Special Inter-American Conference, op. cit. supra note 39, Resolution
XXII, reprinted in 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 445, 458 (1966).
71. Mr. Thomas C. Mann, then Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs and
generally acknowledged to be a principal spokesman and policy-maker with respect
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doubt that the much-cherished American international law of nonintervention has undergone a profound metamorphosis since 1959.
In January 1962, the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers
of Foreign Affairs, meeting in Punta del Este, Uruguay, condemned
adherence to communism as incompatible with the inter-American
system, excluded the Cuban Government from participation in the
system, and resolved to impose a series of political and economic sanctions against Cuba.72 In October, 1962, in the case of the Cuban
"quarantine," the OAS acquiesced for the first time in the open use
of military force against another American republic. And in April,
1965, the United States on its own authority landed its armed forces
in the Dominican Republic, ostensibly to preserve the lives of foreign nationals, 73 but more probably to forestall what it feared would
be the "establishment of another communist government in the
Western Hemisphere." 74 This re-assertion by the United States of an
to Latin America, in The Dominican Crisis: Correcting Some Misconceptions, 53 DEP'T
STATE Bou.. 730 (1965). Mr. Theodore Draper has noted that, in the midst of the
Dominican affair and recurring charges that the United States had abandoned
adherence to the policy of non-intervention codified since the 1930's in the basic
instruments of the inter-American system, Secretary Mann "had criticized both
the OAS and the U.N. Charters for having been drawn up in '19th century terms.'"
Draper has also observed that it was another high official of the Department of State,
Mr. W. Averell Harriman, who had told a group in Montevideo (again, in the midst
of the Dominican intervention) that the doctrine of non-intervention was ,becoming
"obsolete." Draper, The Dominican Crisis: A Case Study in American Policy, in Commentary, vol. 40, no. 6, Dec. 1965, pp. 33, 66, citing the New York Times, May 7 &: 9,
1965, and Look, June 15, 1965.
72. For a survey of the Punta del Este Conference and its implications for the interAmerican system, see Macdonald, The Organization of American States in Action, 15
U. TORONTO L.J. 359, 382-95 (1964). See also, Fenwick, The Issues at Punta del
Este: Non-Intervention v. Collective Security, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 469 (1962).
73. Mann, supra note 71; Meeker, The Dominican Situation in the Perspective of
International Law, 53 DEP'T STATE Bou.. 60 (1965).
74. President Johnson and the Department of State initially maintained that the
United States' intervention was undertaken to preserve the lives of foreign nationals.
After the United States' commitment of troops increased, however, officials in Washington began to speak of a "second stage" in the intervention, in response to what Under
Secretary of State Thomas C. Mann characterized as "a clear and present danger of
the forcible seizure of power by the Communists." President Johnson spoke equally
plainly to a group of visitors :to the White House: "We don't propose to sit here in
our rocking chairs with our hands folded and let the Communists set up any Government in the Western Hemisphere.'' Mr. Leonard C. Meeker, the Legal Adviser of the
Dominican affair. Although he has said that "we might simply have invoked the
we did not pursue some particular legal analysis or code, but instead sought a practical
and satisfactory solution to a pressing problem.'' As the Department's problem became
ever more pressing, its search for a "practical and satisfactory solution" led it to the
conclusion that the United States had actually landed its armed forces in the Dominican
Republic in order to bring an end to a civil war and to maintain minimum public
order. This third explanation for the United States' unilateral action appears to form
the basis for Mr. Meeker's non-"fundamentalist" and retrospective analysis of the
Dominican affair. Although he has said that "we might simply have invoked the
Monroe Doctrine," Mr. Meeker apparently rejected that rationale, not because the
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international police power in the New World was not merely subsequently endorsed by the OAS, but the "peace-keeping" operation of
its ostensible surrogate was assumed by the Organization.75 The invocation of the notion of "multilateral intervention" or "collective
intervention" and the continuing controversy over the latitude
afforded to regional arrangements under the UN Charter must not
obscure the simple fact that the territory of an American republic
was occupied by the armed forces of another, in contravention of the
fundamental tenet of the inter-American system. These developments, as well as the formation and operation of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, the progress toward the adoption of
an inter-American convention on human rights, and the launching
of an ambitious program for the economic development of Latin
America, have reflected the growing recognition that the public
order of the American continent may be threatened as much by internal forces within the American republics as by intervention from
without.
Regardless of one's own views of the propriety or lawfulness of
Monroe Doctrine as a legal basis for armed intervention in the affairs of American
states was discarded three decades ago, but rather because it was apparently deemed
to be too "theoretical" and not altogether consistent with his "practical view" of
international law.
For the text of the official statements, over a period of days, justifying the armed
intervention on different, and occasionally inconsistent grounds, see 'White House
Press Release, April 28, 1965, in 52 DEP'T. STATE BULL. 738 (1965); Statement by President Johnson, April 30, 1965, in id. at 742; Statement by President Johnson, May 2,
1965, in id. at 744-48. See also, The Guardian, May 4, 1965; The Times (London),
May 7, 1965. For Mr. Meeker's views, see The Dominican Situation in the Perspective
of International Law, 53 DEP'T STATE BULL. 60 (1965). For Secretary Mann's description of the "two stages" of the Dominican intervention-humanitarian intervention
followed by the effort to prevent a Communist seizure of power-see The Dominican
Crisis: Correcting Some Misconceptions, 53 DEP'T STATE BULL. 730 (1965). For a welldocumented account of the Dominican affair and the view that "two stages" never
existed except in the press releases issued by the White House and the Department
of State, see Draper, supra note 71._
In an editorial of May 3, 1965, The Times (London), p. 13, col. 2, noted that
"President Johnson has taken the deliberate risk of touching Latin American feelings
on their most sensitive spot by recalling the days when Theodore Roosevelt policed
the Caribbean with marines .••." In an editorial of May 3, 1965, The New York Times,
p. 32, col. I, questioned the factual basis of the United States' decision to intervene "to
prevent another Cuba," and added:
The massing of American Marines and paratroopers in ever-increasing numbers already has stirred bitter recollections throughout Latin America and the
world of the excesses of "gunboat diplomacy." A unilateral decision to assign
these troops an active role in helping the Dominican military junta put down the
revolt would run counter to all the principles of "progress, democracy and social
justice," for which Mr. Johnson appealed •••.
75. For the resolution establishing the Inter-American Peace Force, see Tenth
Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, OAS Doc. No. 39 (English),
reprinted in 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 987 (1965), and 4 INTERNAnONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 594
(1965).
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the new interventionism, there is a natural and justifiable inclination
to applaud the essentially non-political work of the Commission. The
Commission's success, particularly in the Dominican Republic, may
do much to encourage the belief that there may yet emerge for the
American continent a legal regime for the protection of human
rights similar to the European model. Nevertheless, I would like to
suggest that Latin American history, the remains of the American
international law of non-intervention, and the constitutional inhibitions of the United States all weigh heavily against such optimism.
There are several fundamental reasons why a legal structure for
the protection of human rights such as that created in Western
Europe would prove unworkable in the Americas. In the first place,
the European Convention on Human Rights and the machinery
established thereunder reflect the unique post-war situation of
Western Europe and the renewed commitment of those shattered
democracies to rebuild their societies on the basis of guarantees for
fundamental freedoms. As Dr. A. H. Robertson has observed:
The provisions about human rights in the Statute of the Council of
Europe, the obligations undertaken in the European Convention
and the machinery of the Commission and the Court are ... primarily
to preserve the rule of law and the principles of democracy in the
member States and, should the danger arise, forestall any trend to
dictatorship before it is too late.76

, It is most significant that the human rights program of the Council
of Europe is primarily designed to preserve existing rights rather
than to create and enforce new and unknown rights. The program
rests in large part on the assumption that the states adhering to the
Convention are generally committed to democratic government and
basic freedoms. It rests, too, upon a considerable degree of political
and economic inter-dependence amongst the parties and upon a substantial number of common interests and common ideals. The states
adhering to the Convention, and particularly those that have accepted
the right of individual petition, have relinquished a portion of their
sovereignty as an expression of their commitment to the principles
of the Convention and as an indication of their willingness to subject
their domestic institutions to the scrutiny of a world beyond their
separate frontiers. They have chosen to permit an international body
to adjudge the extent to which their political and judicial institutions
conform to the international standards set by the Convention in the
76. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN E'Ull.OPE 6 (1963). (Emphasis added.)
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confidence that their institutions will meet the test and with a readiness to make adjustments in the event that they are found wanting.
It requires no particular expertise to perceive, from a mere glance
at the problems confronting the American republics today, that they
are simply not ready for a system that vests individuals with basic
rights under international law and provides judicial machinery for
the vindication of those rights. Dictatorship remains endemic in the
political life of Latin America, violence continues to be the principal
vehicle for the attainment of political power in too many states, and,
as Professor Tannenbaum has noted, "constitutional government has
remained an unsatisfied aspiration," despite "an almost universal
commitment to the ideals of democracy among Latin American
intellectuals and statesmen."77 It would be a mere delusion to believe
that in states struggling to achieve cultural and national unity78little concerned with the interest of their Latin American neighbors
and very much concerned with the maintenance of their own national
sovereignty-respect for human rights and democratic principles
can be effectively inculcated by the erection of a juridical superstructure reflecting the political values and development of Western
Europe. If one can fairly say that the European Convention on
Human Rights embodies the political faith of the people of Western
Europe, one must also acknowledge that it embodies only the wistful longings of the peoples of Latin America.
Latin America is, as Arnold Toynbee has observed, "a world in
itself," one in which the uncritical adoption of alien political forms
and institutions has had an unhappy history. The primitive state of
the judicial machinery in many Latin American states, the tenacity
with which the Latin American republics have continued to adhere
to the principle of international non-responsibility for denial of
77. Tannenbaum, The Political Dilemma in Latin America, 38 FOREIGN .AFFAIRS
497, 499 (1960).
78. As Philip W. Quigg has cogently written:
Despite the importance and appearance of hemispheric solidarity, these factors
do not apply to the countries of Latin America. Their common Hispanic culture
and certain similarities in the way they look upon life and the world around
them obscure a vast indifference to one another and a marked desire to be considered unig_ue •••• [:TJheir knowledge or awareness of other countries of South
and Central America 1s limited largely to contacts sponsored by public or private
agencies of the United States. Pan Americanism has not cut deep, and even the
effort to establish a Common Market has not much strengthened the Latin's sense
of involvement with one another. Though an incident in Panama or Cuba will
remind them how closely their destinies are linked, it is easier to find unity in
what they are against than in what they are for.
Quigg, Latin America: A Broad-Brush Appraisal, 42 FollEIGN .AFFAIRS 399-400 (1964). A
similar view is expressed by Professor Ernest R. May in The Alliance for Progress in
Historical Perspective, 41 FoREIGN AFFAIRS 757,778 (1968). For a thoughtful study of the
concept of hemispheric solidarity, see WIUTAKER, THE WESIERN HEMISPHERE lJ>EA:
ITS RISE AND DECLINE (1954).
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justice to aliens, and the dismal failure of past efforts to establish
regional adjudicative tribunals79 all militate strongly against the
79. Despite the assumption of authorities such as Professor Manley 0, Hudson
that "since their independence began the five Central American states have had a
tradition of solidarity," an immense amount of good will, and two separate cash gifts
from Mr. Andrew Carnegie (to build a permanent headquarters), the Central American Court of Justice (1908-1918) failed to play a significant role in the life of the
area. Its most sympathetic student, Professor Hudson, was compelled to conclude that
the Court did not exercise "any great influence during its short lease of life." Hudson,
The Central American Court of Justice, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 759, 785 (1932). Yet such
was the faith of Professor Hudson in international judicial machinery that he attributed the failure of the Court to incidental factors such as the justices' lack of
judicial independence; their relatively short terms of office; the manner of paying
their salaries (by each justice's own government); and the national oaths required
of each member of the Court. These factors, of course, merely reflected the underlying
fragmentation of Central American society, which doomed the Central American
Court of Justice from the outset.
The proposal of Dr. James Brown Scott and others, see note 14 supra, in the
1920's and 1930's for an Inter-American Tribunal of International Justice did not
arouse much interest in the United States. See INTER-AMERICAN TRIBUNAL OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE: MEMORANDUM PROJECT AND DOCUMENTS ACCOMPANIED BY OBSERVA•
TIONS (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law,
Pamphlet No. 56, 1937). This lack of interest was doubtless caused by the fear that
the United States would be placed at a severe disadvantage before such a tribunal,
Professor Bemis, one of the skeptics, undoubtedly expressed a widely-held view when
he wrote:
[U]nlike the Permanent Court of International Justice that had had been set up
m Europe as an organ of the League of Nations, the judges of the proposed
American court would have been ovenvhelmingly representative of Latin American
jurisprudence by the proportion of ten to one. Whether such a court were a safe
refuge for justice for the United States was debatable.
BEMIS, THE LATIN AMERICAN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 245 (1943).
More recent suggestions by Latin American states for the establishment of regional
international tribunals have proved equally fruitless. There is reason to believe that
the views expressed by Professor Bemis in the early 1940's would be widely shared
by United States policy-makers today. At the Tenth Inter-American Conference, held
in Caracas in 1954, a resolution was adopted asking the Council of the OAS to ascertain the views of members with regard to the establishment of an Inter-American
Court of Justice and, in the event that a majority of states favored such a proposal,
to order the Inter-American Juridical Committee and the Inter-American Council
. of Jurists to prepare a draft statute for such a court. Final Act, Resolution C, in
48 AM. J. INT'L L. 123, 131 (Supp. 1954). The proposal appears to have been relegated
to the limbo of OAS resolutions on juridical matters.
There have been some faint signs of a renewed interest in the creation of a Central
American Court of Justice. See, e.g., Palma Martinez, La Corte de ]usticia Centoramericana, in ORGANIZACI6N DE EsrADOS CENTROAMERICANOS (ODECA), BoLETfN JURIDICO
y LEGISLATIVO 57 (Guatemala 1957). At the Sixth Extraordinary Meeting of Ministers
of Foreign Affairs of Central America, held in Panama in December 1962, a new
charter for the Organization of Central American States (ODECA) was adopted. This
Charter provides for the establishment of a new Central American Court of Justice,
apparently along somewhat less ambitious lines than its ill-fated predecessor. According to one report, the Court is to serve as "an organ of consultation in judicial
matters" and as the Court of Arbitration envisioned in the Central American Treaty
of Economic Integration. Engel, The New Charter of the Organization of Central
American States, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 127, 129-31 (1964). For the text of the new Charter,
see INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES, THE INTER-AMERICAN
SYSTEM: ITS DEVELOPMENT AND STRENGTHENING 480 (1966). The precise purposes, structure, terms of reference, and rules of procedure of the projected tribunal have apparently remained somewhat obscure. Even the composition of the court seems to
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start in the Americas of a human rights program which is based upon
the European Convention on Human Rights and which provides
machinery to adjudicate claims of non-compliance. Moreover, it
would appear somewhat fantastic to expect the very nations that have
most strenuously resisted and challenged the principle of international responsibility for the treatrµ.ent of aliens to undertake positive international obligations with respect to the treatment of their
own nationals.
There is yet another reason why we must regard with considerable skepticism efforts to encourage the inter-American system to
adopt the basic structure of the human rights program of the Council
of Europe, or perhaps any convention on human rights. Without the
support and adherence of the United States there can be no reasonable expectation that a human rights convention operating within
the framework of the inter-American system will ever be widely
ratified. The Latin Americans would doubtless feel that it was an
unflattering and paternalistic assessment of their national institutions to be asked to surrender a substantial degree of their national
sovereignty while the United States remains unwilling to do likewise.
And there is little doubt that the same constitutional considerations
that to date have prevented United States ratification of other conventions in the human rights field will continue to compel it to
refrain from adhering to an American version of the European
Convention on Human Rights. 80 It would be wise to consider the
possibility that a convention which does not work and which is not
widely ratified may do more harm to the cause of international
protection of human rights than would no convention at all.
Thus, for the effective protection of human rights in the Amerbe open to some doubt. Thus, Mr. Engel is able to report only that the provision of
article 14 of the new ODECA Charter, providing for a tribunal composed of the
"presidents of the Judicial Powers" of the member states "probably means the presidents of the respective Supreme Courts." Engel, supra at 129. (Emphasis added.) On
March 30, 1965, the new Charter of ODECA came into force. See Engel, The New
ODECA, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 806 (1966).
80. From the very outset, the United States announced that it would be unable
to adhere to an American human rights convention or to accept the jurisdiction of
a regional court of human rights. Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs, Final Act 18-19 (1959); :Ball, Issue for the Americas: Non-Intervention v. Human Rights and the Preservation of Democratic Institutions, 15
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 21, 26 (1961). For a comprehensive examination of the
constitutional probleins involved, from the perspective of North American municipal
law and of international law, and a resounding dissent from what appears to remain
the prevailing view, see McDougal & Leighton, The Rights of Man in the World
Community: Constitutional Illusions Versus Rational Action, 14 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB, 490 (1949), reprinted in 59 YALE L.J. 60 (1949), and in McDOUGAL, STUDIES IN
WoRLD Punuc ORDER 335 (1960).
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ican continent, within obvious limitations, it may be preferable to
rely upon the non-judicial, and essentially non-political, efforts of an
agency like the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. The
Commission can concern itself with the more flagrant violations of
human rights, can use the exposure techniques at its disposal to
seek corrective action within the framework of municipal law, and
can play some role in safeguarding fundamental freedoms during
periods of strife in the internal order of states. The only other effective alternative in contemporary Latin America would seem to be a
regional program of coercion based upon the notion that the constituent instruments of the inter-American system permit, or should
permit, "collective intervention" in any case deemed to affect the
peace of the Americas. Such a program for the protection of human
rights might well appeal to those who agree with Professor Richard
Falk that "there is a basic difference between regional coercion that
contradicts and that which fulfills universal conceptions of minimum
conditions for an acceptable form of domestic order.'' 81 However, it
would appear to be a less than satisfactory solution to those who do
not have complete faith in their ability to perceive these "universal
conceptions," or who would be reluctant to allow a regional arrangement the freedom to act upon its own formulation of these "universal
conceptions" without the authorization of the global institution
created for the maintenance of international peace and security-the
United Nations.
One student of the inter-American system, in noting the United
States' inevitable objections to an international instrument like the
European Convention, has suggested as an alternative a treaty that
would elaborate "a more definite statement" of the principles of
democratic government and human rights and that would establish
a commission with broad powers to investigate alleged violations of
human rights. In 1962, he wrote:
Such a treaty would confirm the principles to which the OAS adheres, but would not attempt to set up an international system to
review and pass upon the judicial processes of individual governments-a step for which the American republics are still not prepared.82

A human rights program such as the one outlined above does not,
of course, require a treaty. A commission of the kind suggested is
81. Falk, Janus Tormented: The International Law of Internal War, in INTERNATIONAL Asl'ECTS OF CIVIL STRIFE 185, 243 (Rosenau ed. 1964).
82. DREIER, THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES AND THE HEMISl'HERE

134 (1962).
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already in existence, and its work program is in fact designed to
provide "a more definite statement" of the principles of democracy
and human rights. Its recent history indicates that an agency dedicated to impartial fact-gathering and to the exposure of the more
flagrant violations of fundamental liberties might well be the most
prudent and workable alternative to a carte blanche grant of authority to the political organs of the OAS or to the creation of administrative and judicial machinery unsuited to the political realities of
modern Latin America. However, the extent to which political realities will permit even the present Commission to operate evenhandedly is not free of doubt. Although the Commission has reported
the receipt of petitions from within the United States, it has shown
no inclination to undertake an inquiry into alleged violations of civil
rights in the United States. In view of the rebuff that it might receive
if it sought to do so, and of the ensuing detrimental effect upon the
Commission's future usefulness, this reluctance is well considered.
But it raises the fundamental question of the extent to which an
international body of this kind, avowedly concerned with the promotion and protection of human rights in all of the American republics,
can indulge the United States' traditional reluctance to accept any
international responsibility for alleged deprivations of the rights of
its nationals. If the United States' constitutional and political inhibitions are indeed to be indulged, in the interest of the Commission's
effective operation in less-well-endowed parts of the Western Hemisphere, the Commission will ultimately be required to acknowledge
that it exists only to oversee the conduct of the OAS' HispanicAmerican members. Alternatively, if there is to be any pretense at
an even-handed administration of its mandate, the Commission may
feel obliged to confine its intervention to situations in which the
national system of government and law enforcement has completely
broken down.
The next year or two will be especially important in determining
the future usefulness of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights. If it can remain scrupulously free of the political decisionmaking and goals of the OAS and if it can retain its reputation for
impartiality, we may expect the Commission to continue to exercise
an important, and possibly expanded,83 role in the years ahead. If so,
83. At its thirteenth session, in April 1966, the Commission took a far-reaching
step in the direction of expanding its role and functions. In pursuance of the request
made in Resolution XXII of the Second Special Inter-American Conference (Rio de
Janeiro, November 1965), that it "conduct a continuing survey of the observance of
fundamental human rights in each of the member states of the Organization," and
under the authority of article 9 d. of its enabling act (empowering it "to urge the Gov-
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the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights may well have
paved a middle road toward the international protection of the
fundamental human rights of the peoples of the New World.
ernments of the member states to supply it with information on the measures adopted
by them in matters of human rights'), the Commission resolved to request annual
reports from each member state of the OAS on the measures adopted by each to ad•
just their municipal law to the principles enunciated in the American Declaration
of the Rights and Duties of Man and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
These annual reports are also to provide information on "any suspension of guarantees
and the reasons therefor." Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on
the Work Accomplished During Its Thirteenth Session, April 18 to 28, 1966, OEA/
Ser. L/V /II.74, Doc. 35 (English) (Sept. 30, 1966), pp. 38-39.

